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Abstract 
This paper investigates changes to the macroeconomic transmission mechanism in Turkey 
following a major reform of monetary policy in the early 2000s.  We use a Threshold VAR 
(TVAR) framework to test for and then estimate a model with endogenous transitions 
between regimes.  We detect two regimes, with a clear transition between them in 2003-4.  
The pre-reform regime is characterized by high inflation, passive monetary policy and 
persistent responses to shocks.  The post-reform regime is characterized by low inflation, 
active and credible monetary policy and markedly less persistent responses to shocks.  Using 
a model that contains sufficient variables to capture diverse transmission mechanisms, 
working through the real exchange rate, domestic credit and monetary policy, we find 
evidence of sharp changes in transmission mechanisms.  Post-reform, the response of Turkey 
to macroeconomic shocks has changed to be similar to those in other modern, market-
orientated economies.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates changes to the macroeconomic transmission mechanism following a 
major change in monetary policy regime.  We consider the case of Turkey.  Following 
decades of inflation, volatile output growth and frequent large and destabilizing nominal 
exchange rate depreciations, Turkey enacted a package of reforms in the early 2000s aimed at 
promoting macroeconomic stability through the establishment of a credible monetary policy 
framework.  These reforms appear to have been a success; inflation has fallen, exchange rate 
volatility has fallen and output growth has become more stable.  Indeed, in sharp contrast to 
previous global crises, Turkey has weathered the financial crisis beginning in 2008 with less 
volatility in exchange rate and inflation rates than many other countries. 
This paper investigates the impact of these reforms on the macroeconomic transmission 
mechanism in Turkey. The transmission mechanism describes the response of 
macroeconomic variables such as output, the price level, interest rates and the exchange rate 
to a variety of shocks. There are suggestions in the literature that the transmission mechanism 
may have changed.  Karasoy et al. (2005) find evidence of a changed monetary policy rule, 
Kara and Ogunc (2005) argue that the impact of the exchange rate on the domestic economy 
has changed, while Basci et al. (2007) argue that the importance of interest rates and 
domestic credit has changed.   This paper takes a wider perspective by examining changes in 
the transmission mechanism as a whole, rather than specific aspects of it.    
Much contemporary macroeconomic analysis focuses on the transmission mechanism 
(summarised in Christiano et al., 1999 and Boivin et al., 2010).  This literature emphasises 
the complexity the transmission mechanism, which is seen as operating through many distinct 
channels.  Mishkin (1996) distinguishes between interest rate, exchange rate, equity price, 
bank lending and separate corporate and household balance-sheet channels.  Boivin et al. 
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(2010) discuss interest rate, wealth, intertemporal substitution, exchange rate, bank-based and 
balance sheet channels.  Other models highlight alternatives such as liquidity and risk-taking 
channels (Cooley and Quadrini, 2004, Borio  and Zhu, 2008).  Central Banks also highlight 
the diverse ways in which policy rates affect the real economy.  For example, the Bank of 
England’s view of the transmission mechanism is that changes in policy rates affect money 
market interest rates, asset prices, the exchange rate and expectations (Bank of England, 
2009) while the ECB (2010) places more emphasis on effects working through the labour 
market and the supply of credit.  This is reflected in the variables included in our empirical 
model; we use output, prices, a short-term interest rate, the amount of credit in the economy 
and the real exchange rate.  The span of these variables is wide enough to encompass the 
diverse transmission mechanisms considered in the literature while retaining parsimony.   
The literature also emphasises likely changes in the transmission mechanism over time.  
Transmission reflects structural macroeconomic relationships as well as the behaviour of 
policymakers.  Changes in structural relationships or in the policymaking environment will 
therefore change the transmission mechanism.  We model possible changes in the 
transmission mechanism using a Threshold VAR (TVAR) model (Tsay, 1998). This is a 
natural extension of the standard approach is modelling the transmission mechanism using a 
VAR (Peersman and Smets, 2003, Christiano et al., 2010).   
Our use of a TVAR framework is motivated by a number of factors.  The most obvious 
alternative approach is to assume a regime break on a particular date and estimate separate 
models using data from either side of that break.  We prefer the TVAR approach since it 
allows us to test for the existence of multiple regimes and to date switches of the economy 
between these regimes, rather than simply assuming the existence of and dating of regime 
change a priori.  Other possible alternatives include using a model in which the coefficients 
of a VAR evolve over time (Boivin et al., 2010) or a Markov-switching model in which 
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transitions between regimes are random.  Neither seems appropriate in this case; the clear 
change in the policy framework seems inconsistent with gradual evolution of parameters and 
random transitions. 
Our model develops previous work by Kara and Ogunc (2005), who estimate VAR models 
compromising the output gap, nominal exchange rate depreciation, the core inflation rate and 
the inflation rate for the pre- and post-2001 period.  We focus on the transmission mechanism 
as a whole rather than just the exchange rate channel investigated by Kara and Ogunc (2005), 
and are able to use more data from the post-reform period.  Our work also complements the 
analysis of Basci et al. (2007) by providing econometric estimates to complement their more 
descriptive analysis.   
The paper is structured as follows.  We introduce our TVAR model in the next section. 
Section 3 outlines the data used in the estimation.  The empirical results on nonlinear impulse 
responses and forecast error decompositions are presented in section 4. Finally, the paper 
ends with concluding remarks and policy suggestions.   
2. Methodology 
A VAR representation of our model can be written as,  
1 1
p q
t i t i i t i t
i i
X A X B Z  
 
     ,        (1) 
where the vector tX  contains  observations on the endogenous variables at time t, 
[ ]'t t t t t tX y p i c e , where y is (log) output, p  is the log price index, i  is the short-term 
interest rate, c  is the (log) amount of credit and e  is the (log) real exchange rate.  The vector 
tZ  contains  observations on exogenous variables at time t, [ 1]'
p us us
t t t tZ oil y i , where  
poil  is 
the (log) oil price (in US Dollars), usy  is (log) US output, 
usi  is the US policy rate (the 
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effective federal funds rates rate) and 1 is a constant). t  is  a vector of structural shocks at 
time t, [ ]'y i c e      .  A and B are coefficient matrices. The transmission mechanism is 
captured by the impulse response functions that describes the response of the endogenous 
variables to the shocks in t .   
The TVAR model (Atasanova, 2003; Balke, 2000) is a simple extension of the VAR model is 
which the economy has two regimes and switches between them depending on the value of a 
threshold variable. Our TVAR model is: 
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
[ ] [ ] )
p q p q
t t d i t i i t i t d i t i i t i t
i i i i
X I c A X B Z I c A X B Z u      
   
   
         
   
       (2) 
where c  is the threshold variable and   is the threshold; 
( )t dI c    is a dummy indicator 
function that equals 1 when t dc   , and 0 otherwise.  Equation (2) states that the economy is 
in regime 1 when the threshold variable, lagged d periods, exceeds or is equal to the 
threshold; otherwise, the economy is in regime 2.   The model allows us to estimate the 
regime-specific parameters ( 1
1A ,
2
1A , 
1
1B  and 
2
1B ), the threshold value (  ) and the delay 
parameter ( d ).   
We follow the conventional procedure in specifying and estimating our TVAR model.  We 
begin with the VAR model in (1).  We first determine p and q, the number of lags of 
endogenous and exogenous variables, on the basis of the Akaike and Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criteria (considering up to 12 lags of each).  We then test for the existence of 
multiple regimes using the C(d) threshold test statistic proposed by Tsay (1998).  If this test is 
significant, we reject the linear VAR in (1) in favour of the nonlinear TVAR in (2).  The null 
hypothesis is 
1 2 1 2
0 : ,i i i iH A A B B  , in which case the model is linear and (2) simplifies to 
(1).  The testing procedure re-orders the data according to ascending values of the threshold 
variable and estimates (1) using a sub-sample of the data (in practice, if the first m0 
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observations of the re-ordered sample; we consider both m0=50 and m0=100,). These 
estimates are then used to generate predicted residuals for the remainder of the sample.  If the 
model is linear, the predicted residuals will be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in 
the arranged regression.  These predicted residuals are therefore regressed on the explanatory 
variables and the C(d) statistic calculated as the test for the joint significance of the 
explanatory variables. The test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution with 
( 1)k pk qv  degrees of freedom under the null, where which k and v are the number of 
variables in tX and tZ .  We calculate C(d) statistics for a range of candidate transmission 
variables and delay parameters considering a delay of up to 12 periods for each variable. If 
there is evidence of multiple regimes, we select the delay parameter d  for each transition 
variable as the value which that maximises the Tsay test statistic and then determine the 
threshold value    using a grid search, choosing the value that maximizes the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC).  We then estimate the model and calculate impulse response 
functions.  
 
3. Data 
We use monthly data for the period 1986:1 to 2010:11, using data drawn from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF.  This timespan gives us sufficient 
information to investigate the issues at hand. We use monthly data in order to maximise the 
number of observations on the post-reform regime: with a plausible breakpoint in the early 
years of this decade, quarterly data would not give sufficient observations to estimate the 
dynamics of this regime.  As a consequence, we use industrial production as a proxy for 
GDP.  This standard assumption is perhaps less questionable in the case of a middle-income 
emerging economy such as Turkey.  We measure the price level using the consumer price 
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index. The short-term interest rate is the interbank rate and credit is measured as the total 
volume of credits in the financial system in terms of real Turkish Lira.  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
An important methodological issue concerns whether to specify our model using levels or 
first differences.  Table 1 reports p-values for Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
unit root tests: they suggest that our variables are I(1) over the full sample.
1
  Many studies 
have estimated VAR models using the levels of nonstationary variables (e.g. Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992, Bernanke  and Gertler, 1995).  In doing so they have adapted the logic of 
Fuller’s (1976, Theorem 8.5.1) demonstration that differencing does not help to achieve 
asymptotic efficiency in an autoregressive model and merely results in a loss of information 
to the VAR framework.   
A related issue concerns whether to include the price level or the inflation rate in the model: 
although most of the literature uses the inflation rate, some influential studies, eg Bernanke 
and Gertler (1995), use the price level.  In our data, the inflation rate is I(1) in the early part 
of the sample but I(0) in the later part (this is not uncommon, e.g. Halunga et al., 2009).  
Using price level rather than the inflation rate avoids potential distortions caused by using a 
variable whose order of integration potentially switches between regimes.
 2
  However, we do 
use the inflation rate as a candidate transition variable. 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents C(d)  using the interbank rate and the inflation rate as candidate transition 
variables, using p=3 and q=4 and  d=1,2,3.  There is a strong rejection of the assumption of 
                                                          
1
 We also applied Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test, which allows for one endogenous structural break in 
the series.  This test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root with a break for all variables. The results are not 
reported but are available upon request.      
2
 Our main results are broadly robust to using the inflation rate, but there are some differences and estimates are 
less well determined. 
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constant parameters, with all the reported tests statistics rejecting the null hypothesis of 
linearity.   In all cases the strongest rejection occurs where d=1. This is therefore selected as 
the delay parameter, indicating swift regime transitions based on the value of the transition 
variable in the previous month. 
<Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here> 
The estimated threshold values for this value of d, obtained from grid search, are 28.2% for 
the interbank rate and 22.1% for the inflation rate.  Both transition variables give similar 
regime classifications (see Figure 1).  With the interbank rate, there is a single regime 
transition, in March 2004.  With the inflation rate, the economy is in the first regime until 
July 2003,  after which date it is entirely in the second regime.  The first regime can be 
viewed as one of high-inflation, running from the start of our sample in 1986 to mid-2003 or 
early-2004.  During that time the Turkish economy experienced severe economic crises in 
1994 and 2001, triggered by banking sector fragility and accumulating current account 
deficits (Akyürek, 2006). The second regime can be characterized as a low inflation regime; 
inflation was reduced to single digits by the end of 2004 and has remained comparatively low 
and stable since.  
Tsay’s C(d) statistics are designed as tests of the TVAR against the linear VAR.  Following 
Panagiotidis and Pelloni (2007) we also applied other linearity tests to estimated residuals 
from the linear VAR in (1), the Tsay (1986), Engle (1982) and Brock et al. (1996) BDS tests, 
the Hinich (1996) bicovariance test and the McLeod and Li (1983) test. These are designed as 
general tests of the linearity hypothesis rather than tests against a specific nonlinear 
alternative.  These tests confirmed the rejection of the linear VAR in (1).
3
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
                                                          
3
 The results of those tests are not reported here but available upon request from the corresponding author. 
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Table 3 presents estimated variance decompositions for output and the price level, calculated 
using estimates of (1) and (2).
 4
  Two key points emerge.  First, there is clear evidence of 
changes in transmission mechanisms between regimes.  In the pre-reform regime, the impact 
of both exchange rate and credit shocks falls more on output than on prices; this is reversed in 
the post-reform regime.  At a 2-year horizon, the combined effect of these shocks explains 
only 19% of the variance of prices in the pre-reform regime compared to 63% in the post-
reform regime. The corresponding figures for output are 35% and 14%.  These changes imply 
that, post-reform, the real economy is better insulated from these shocks, a source of 
instability in the previous regime.  Second, there is evidence of more effective stabilization 
policy.  The contribution of output shocks to the variance of output and of price level shocks 
to the variance of prices is both lower and dies away more quickly in the post-reform regime.  
Related to this, the contribution of monetary policy shocks to the variances of output and 
prices is higher in the post-reform regime.  This is evidence that monetary policy has a 
stronger impact on the real economy in this regime, suggesting a more credible policy 
regime.   
<Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3  about here> 
These findings are reflected in the estimated impulse response functions, presented in Figures 
2-6.5   The responses obtained from positive one-standard deviation shocks are plotted with 
their upper and lower one-standard-error bands in order to assess their significance over the 
24 months horizon.
6
 The impact of shocks in the post-reform period is often significantly 
different from the pre-reform regime and from a simple VAR model estimated using the full 
                                                          
4
 We present estimated variance decompositions and impulse responses using the interbank rate as the transition 
variable.  
5
 In order to compare impulse responses under different regimes, we scale the responses of each variable by the 
standard deviation in each regime (Enders, 2003).  By doing so we are comparing the response to shocks of 
equal magnitude in each regime. 
6
 The standard error bands are generated from 1000 draws by Monte Carlo Integration based on Sims and Zha 
(1999). 
10 
 
sample which largely reflects results from the pre-reform period although the relative 
shortness of the post-reform periods means that the confidence intervals for that regime are 
relatively wide at long horizons.  Output falls in a persistent response to a real exchange rate 
shock in the pre-reform period whereas the response in the post-reform period is mainly 
insignificant. A large and persistent response of the price level to credit shocks is also 
replaced by a small and insignificant response in the post-reform period.  As Figure 4 shows, 
the response of prices and output to interest rate shocks is also smaller in the post-reform 
period, with the disappearance of a strong “price puzzle” in the post-reform period especially 
noteworthy. This is consistent with evidence from other countries that the “price puzzle” 
maybe an artifact of accommodative monetary policy (Castelnuovo and Surico, 2010). Taken 
together, these figures reinforce our main finding, that the transmission mechanism changed 
markedly following the reforms enacted in the early 2000s. 
<Insert Figure 4  Figure 5 and Figure 6  about here> 
The estimated impulse responses of the interest rate to output and price level shocks highlight 
the importance of monetary policy in achieving stabilization.  It is notable that there is no 
interest rate response to output or price level shocks in the high inflation regime; monetary 
policy appears to be completely passive to these key macroeconomic variables.  By contrast, 
there is a strong monetary policy response to output shocks in the low inflation regime, 
indicating a much more active pursuit of policy goals. The response of interest rates to the 
price level is more complex, with an initial accommodating reduction in rates being unwound 
a year after the initial shock.  
4. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a simple empirical macroeconomic model of Turkey that focuses 
on changes in the transmission mechanism that generate changes in output, the price level 
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and other key macroeconomic variables in response to a variety of shocks.  Recognising the 
major reform of economic policy following the crisis of 2001, we have tested for the 
existence of multiple regimes.  Having detected these, we estimated a TVAR model that 
allows the structure of the macroeconomic model to vary across distinct regimes and used 
these estimates to calculate impulse response functions that describe the response of 
endogenous variables to macroeconomic shocks and to decompose the variance of 
endogenous variables into components that reflect the effect of shocks. 
We have found clear evidence of a change in the transmission mechanism and dated this to 
2003-4; the change in regime therefore reflects changes in the macroeconomic policy 
environment.  The Turkish economy can be characterized as being in a high inflation regime 
from the start of our sample until the reforms took effect; since then it has been in a more 
stable low inflation regime. We found clear evidence of changes in the response of output and 
the price level to a variety of shocks, to the real exchange rate, the amount of credit in the 
economy and the policy interest rate; from this we conclude that the transmission mechanism 
did change. 
Our paper argues that there was a marked changed in all aspects of the transmission 
mechanisms in Turkey following the successful implementation of the reform program.  A 
natural development of our work would be to consider individual transmission mechanisms in 
more detail to assess how it has changed.  This would require a more detailed and structural 
model than that used in this paper.  We hope to address this in future work. 
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Table 1a. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and  Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests  
    Levels First Differences 
    t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value 
ty  ADF -1.4228 0.5712 -20.8484 0.0000 
  PP -1.3850 0.5898 -21.1938 0.0000 
tp  ADF 0.6432 0.8546 -9.5544 0.0000 
  PP 0.9625 0.9110 -5.3522 0.0000 
ti  ADF -2.9823 0.1390 -18.0571 0.0000 
  PP -2.3227 0.1655 -18.0653 0.0000 
tc  ADF 0.8472 0.9947 -13.2404 0.0000 
  PP 0.8295 0.9944 -13.2404 0.0000 
te  ADF -1.2629 0.6474 -11.7153 0.0000 
  PP -1.1839 0.6822 -12.8079 0.0000 
p
toil  ADF -1.3077 0.6268 -13.0091 0.0000 
  PP -1.1993 0.6756 -13.0091 0.0000 
us
ti  ADF -1.3624 0.6008 -6.1573 0.0000 
  PP -1.6657 0.4477 -8.4546 0.0000 
us
ty  ADF -1.7745 0.3928 -4.8144 0.0001 
  PP -1.4851 0.5400 -18.4062 0.0000 
Note: ADF is the augmented Dickey–Fuller test statistic and PP is the Phillips–Perron test statistic. 
 
 
 
  Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics  
  ty  tp  ti  tc  te  
p
toil  
us
ti  
us
ty  
 Mean 4.313 1.513 51.049 10.580 4.816 3.276 4.471 4.399 
 Median 4.320 2.407 48.095 10.328 4.760 3.006 5.070 4.482 
 Std. Dev. 0.284 3.135 42.161 0.851 0.226 0.603 2.436 0.194 
 Skewness -0.056 -0.442 4.095 1.030 0.357 0.838 -0.123 -0.328 
 Kurtosis 2.049 1.699 29.847 2.799 2.079 2.561 2.289 1.531 
 Jarque-
Bera 11.418 30.833 9716.389 53.413 16.910 37.361 7.051 32.246 
 Prob. 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 
N. of Obs. 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 299 
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Table 2 . Multivariate Threshold Nonlinearity Test 
 Interbank Rate  Inflation 
d m0 C(d) P-value d m0 C(d) P-value 
1 50 216.95 0.000 1 50.00 216.77 0.000 
1 100 197.62 0.000 1 100.00 210.21 0.000 
2 50 185.83 0.001 2 50.00 132.00 0.000 
2 100 187.34 0.001 2 100.00 143.65 0.000 
3 50 177.50 0.004 3 50.00 116.33 0.010 
3 100 172.74 0.007 3 100.00 139.71 0.000 
  0.2208 AIC -4834.6   0.2820 AIC -2319.63 
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Table 3. Decomposition of Variance for  Output  and Prices 
 Output 
  Linear VAR   Pre-reform Regime Post-reform Regime  
Step ty  tp  ti  tc  te  Step ty  tp  ti  tc  te  Step ty  tp  ti  tc  te  
1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 100.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 72.179 0.102 24.900 0.660 2.158 6 77.040 2.273 1.831 3.220 15.636 6 57.394 0.060 39.310 1.331 1.904 
12 65.846 0.159 30.862 1.318 1.815 12 60.966 3.370 7.878 7.348 20.438 12 50.912 0.149 42.995 3.820 2.124 
18 64.142 0.473 30.610 2.414 2.360 18 54.855 2.945 11.050 12.099 19.050 18 48.198 0.430 41.351 6.720 3.301 
24 62.702 1.053 29.583 3.612 3.050 24 52.292 2.562 10.710 16.618 17.819 24 45.632 0.929 39.192 9.802 4.447 
  Prices 
  Linear VAR  Pre-reform Regime Post-reform Regime  
Step ty  tp  ti  tc  te  Step ty  tp  ti  tc  te  Step ty  t
p  ti  t
c
 t
e
 
1 3.499 96.501 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 4.546 95.454 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 4.070 95.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 3.593 58.716 29.032 3.387 5.273 6 13.961 81.131 3.327 0.008 1.572 6 1.491 56.637 25.500 6.463 9.909 
12 4.995 48.710 32.453 4.563 9.279 12 9.308 83.452 2.469 0.248 4.523 12 0.802 42.775 19.123 19.939 17.361 
18 6.009 44.642 32.049 5.621 11.678 18 8.426 78.170 2.016 1.908 9.480 18 0.645 34.250 12.581 31.982 20.541 
24 6.754 42.500 30.878 6.638 13.230 24 10.758 67.618 2.643 5.421 13.560 24 0.750 28.516 8.212 40.888 21.634 
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a. Threshold Variable: Interbank rate 
 
b. Threshold variable: Inflation rate 
 
Fig. 1. Regime classification.   
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Fig. 2. Responses to one-standard-deviation real exchange rate shocks.   
Responses to Real Exchange Rate Shocks: Linear VAR
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Fig. 3. Responses to one-standard-deviation credit shocks. 
 
Responses to Credit Shocks: Linear VAR
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Fig. 4. Responses to one-standard-deviation interbank rate shocks. 
Responses to Interbank Rate: Linear VAR
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Fig. 5. Responses to one-standard-deviation price shocks. 
Responses to Price Shocks:Linear VAR
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Fig. 6. Responses to one-standard-deviation output shocks.  
 
Responses to Output Shocks: Linear VAR
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Appendix: Data 
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